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Ane Aranguiz and Sacha Garben
In a bold and remarkable move, the new President of the 
European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, has tasked 
her Commissioner for Jobs and Social Rights, Nicolas 
Schmit, with the mission to develop a proposal for a legal 
instrument ensuring that every worker in the EU has a fair 
minimum wage, to be delivered within the first 100 days of 
this new Commission’s mandate. 
On the one hand, this could be seen as a natural continua-
tion of the legacy of the Juncker Commission in strengthen-
ing Europe’s social dimension. Indeed, the centre-piece of 
the outgoing Commission’s social achievements, the Euro-
pean Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR), is the political anchor 
point for the delivery of these new ambitions concerning a 
minimum wage. With a commitment to prevent in-work 
poverty, Principle 6 EPSR enshrines the right to fair wages 
to provide a decent standard of living in a way that it satis-
fies the need of the worker and her/his family in the light of 
national economic and social conditions, whilst enabling ac-
cess to employment and incentives to seek work. It further 
demands that all wages are set in a transparent and predict-
able way. 
On the other hand, the obstacles for adopting a minimum 
wage at EU level are manifold and appear formidable. For 
one, not all Member States have minimum wages. Second, 
the role of social partners in wage setting is a sensitive 
question, and it is not entirely clear how an EU measure 
would be able to accommodate this. From a legal point of 
view, the most important obstacle is the thorny question of 
competence. The EU’s social legal basis, Article 153 TFEU, 
excludes the issue of “pay”. The EPSR, for all its solemnity, 
is not legally binding and does not expand the EU’s compe-
tence to act. However, as this policy brief argues, the over-
looked Article 175 TFEU on cohesion policy could provide 
suitable legal anchor point to successfully launch this im-
portant initiative. 
 
Article 153 TFEU on social policy: a slim and slack rope 
Article 153 TFEU is the EU’s standard social legal basis. It gives 
the EU competence to adopt a range of measures in various 
fields of social policy. Wages are part of “working conditions”, 
which is one of the areas in which Article 153 TFEU allows the 
EU to adopt directives setting minimum requirements in ac-
cordance with the ordinary legislative procedure. However, 
as an explicit exception to the EU’s social competence under 
Article 153 TFEU, its 5th paragraph states that “the provisions 
of this Article shall not apply to pay”.  
Executive Summary 
> The new European Commission has boldly an-
nounced its plans to deliver an EU minimum wage 
legal measure within the first 100 days in office. 
> This commendable ambition raises the much-
contested question of competence in this field. 
> Under Article 153 TFEU, the EU’s main social legal 
basis, the issue of ‘pay’ is excluded from the pro-
visions of this Article (para. 5).  This seems to pre-
vent the adoption, on this legal basis, of a binding 
EU measure that directly fixes the level of mini-
mum wages in the Member States. 
> Another, and oft-overlooked social legal basis can 
be found in Article 175 TFEU on economic, social 
and territorial cohesion. Article 175 TFEU may of-
fer an alternative route to adopt a fully-fledged 
minimum wage directive to diminish the social 
and economic disparities that are hampering a 
harmonious development of the Union in both 
economic and societal terms.  
> The main advantage offered by Article 175 TFEU, 
as compared to the other contending alternative 
legal basis found in the flexibility clause of Article 
352 TFEU, is that it allows the EU to act through 
the ordinary legislative procedure rather than re-
quiring unanimity while maintaining a social fo-
cus. 
> Furthermore, the objective of cohesion policy 
seems the most credible alternative, compared to 
the general harmonisation clause for the internal 
market under 115 TFEU or the free movement of 
workers under Article 46 TFEU. 
 
2 
 
Theorising the ENP – Conference Report 
© Author name 
CEPOB # 1.15 December 2015 CEPOB # 9.19 - December 2019 
 
The Treaty itself does not define ‘pay’. The Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU), however, has consistently held in 
its case law that the limitation under Article 153(5) TFEU 
stands for ‘the establishment of the level of all or some of the 
constituent parts of pay and/or the level of pay in the mem-
ber States, or the setting of a minimum guaranteed wage’ (C-
395/08 - Bruno and Others, EU:C:2010:329, §37; C-268/06 – 
Impact, EU:C:2008:223, §125). This, quite clearly, does not 
bode well for a fully-fledged EU minimum wage directive 
based on Article 153 TFEU. 
On the other hand, the CJEU has confirmed that the exclusion 
of Article 153(5) TFEU cannot hollow out and unduly restrict 
the EU’s competence in relation to the other areas of social 
policy under Article 153(1) TFEU. As an exception to a rule, 
Article 153(5) TFEU has to be interpreted narrowly and it 
should not completely undermine the effectiveness of EU so-
cial law and policy. Hence, as the CJEU has held, the exception 
of ‘pay’ cannot be extended to every issue related to ‘pay’, as 
many areas of social policy would otherwise be deprived of 
much of their substance. Thus, pay has been legitimately in-
cluded in the ‘working conditions’ regarding various types of 
workers’ right to equal treatment under EU directives 
adopted on the basis of Article 153 TFEU.  
The conclusion is that ‘only’ provisions directly interfering in 
the way pay is determined, and the setting of the levels 
thereof, are excluded from EU competence under Article 
153(5) TFEU. It might perhaps not be impossible to conceive 
of an instrument that avoids the setting of wages or the com-
ponents of pay directly, but that instead prescribes certain 
procedural requirements such as transparency and predicta-
bility. It would, however, be a very slim and slack rope to bal-
ance on. Any such measure on the social policy legal basis 
that would manage to avoid the ‘lethal’ exception of para-
graph 5 would inherently and necessarily lack the very sub-
stance and thus legal and political punch that the promised 
initiative should carry.  
Article 175 TFEU on social, economic and territorial cohe-
sion: the road less travelled 
An important part of the rationale of introducing an EU mini-
mum wage is to decrease the social and economic inequali-
ties between different parts of the EU, to promote upward 
social and economic convergence and a more harmonious de-
velopment of the Union. Article 4(2) TFEU qualifies economic, 
social and territorial cohesion as one of the principal areas of 
shared competence. In accordance with Article 2(2) TFEU, 
“When the Treaties confer on the Union a competence 
shared with the Member States in a specific area, the Union 
… may legislate and adopt legally binding acts in that area”.  
More specifically, Article 174 TFEU states that “in order to 
promote its overall harmonious development, the Union shall 
develop and pursue its actions leading to the strengthening 
of its economic, social and territorial cohesion”. Article 175 
TFEU continues that “if specific actions prove necessary out-
side the Funds and without prejudice to the measures de-
cided upon within the framework of the other Union policies, 
such actions may be adopted … in accordance with the ordi-
nary legislative procedure”. Thus, if Article 175 TFEU would 
be used, it would entail QMV and, importantly for the Euro-
pean Parliament, co-decision. 
Interpreting Article 175 TFEU as a possible legal basis for a 
minimum wage directive 
A textual interpretation of Article 175 TFEU, in conjunction 
with Article 174 TFEU, does not in principle seem to oppose 
the adoption of a minimum wage directive, if it would be de-
signed so as to significantly strengthen the Union’s economic 
and social cohesion and thus genuinely diminish disparities 
between Member States. It would be imperative that a rigor-
ous and systematic impact assessment accompany the pro-
posal. This assessment should, through data and reasoned 
projection, provide sufficient ground and reason for the CJEU 
to accept, if the Directive were to be challenged afterwards, 
that the way in which the Directive sets minimum wages for 
the EU genuinely (and not incidentally or purely indirectly) 
contributes to social and/or economic cohesion and the Un-
ion’s harmonious development. The assessment should per-
haps not just focus on the measure’s by reduction of dispari-
ties but also on taking the sharp edges of wage-competition 
that has distorted the internal market as can be seen from 
the Posting-saga, as well as producing upward socio- eco-
nomic convergence). The fact that such a measure would pro-
tect workers in all Member States does not necessarily seem 
to be a problem, as long as it can clearly be shown that in 
doing so, the measure significantly contributes to social 
and/or economic cohesion. 
While this would entail a somewhat creative legal reading of 
the provision, the CJEU has explicitly acknowledged that EU 
cohesion policy  gives extensive discretion to the Union as to 
the actions that might be taken in the field of economic, so-
cial and territorial cohesion (C-420/16 P, Izsák and Dabis v 
Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2019:177, §68). The Court in another 
judgment (C‑166/07, Parliament v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2009: 
499) furthermore considered that “economic and social pro-
gress” correspond to the objectives pursued by the EU policy 
on economic and social cohesion. 
The case to further explore the under-used potential of Arti-
cle 175 TFEU has already been made in the context of eco-
nomic policy (Flynn, 2019), to avoid the lack of legislative 
competence in Article 121 TFEU on economic policy. It seems 
pertinent to cite here, and apply mutatis mutandis, what has 
been said in this respect: “when they wish to institute 
measures that will affect the economic performance of the 
Member States the Union institutions can take another route, 
to overcome the limitations associated with Article 121 TFEU. 
It is perfectly proper for them to adopt such measures on an-
other legal base if the measures in question come with the 
ambit of the Treaty provision used” (ibid.: 48). Indeed, as 
Flynn notes, “In recent years, the Union legislator has turned 
repeatedly to the cohesion policy chapter of the Treaty (Arti-
cles 175 to 178 TFEU) when considering such measures” 
(ibid.: 49). Particularly relevant to counter the argument that 
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recourse to Article 175 TFEU would illegally circumvent the 
constraints of Article 153 TFEU, Flynn considered that: “the 
fact that the effects of the measure will have an impact on 
economic policy does not mean that the use of that other le-
gal base constitutes a circumvention of the limitations asso-
ciated with Article 121 TFEU. The Court accepted in Gauweiler 
and Weiss that monetary policy measures taken by the Euro-
pean Central Bank (‘ECB’) do not fall into the sphere of eco-
nomic policy for the sole reason that they may have indirect 
effects that can also be sought in the context of economic 
policy. By the same logic, measures adopted by the other Un-
ion institutions under other policies are not equivalent to 
economic policy measures due to such indirect effects. More-
over, the fact that such effects are definitely foreseeable by 
the measure’s author(s) and are knowingly accepted does not 
rob them of the status of ‘indirect’ effects” (ibid.: 48). 
The main legal uncertainties concerning Article 175 TFEU as 
a legal basis for a minimum wage directive 
While Article 175 TFEU therefore deserves serious considera-
tion, a number of uncertainties related to using this provision 
as the legal basis for a directive on minimum wages remains.  
First, it is ambiguous what ‘specific action’ under Article 175 
TFEU may entail. As the CJEU held, the “provision does not 
set out the form which such specific actions can take” (Case 
C‑166/07, op cit, § 46). The Court then considered that “the 
Community, through all of its actions, implements an inde-
pendent Community policy, with the result that Title XVII of 
the EC Treaty provides adequate legal bases allowing for the 
adoption of means of action which are specific to the Com-
munity, administered in accordance with the Community reg-
ulatory framework and the content of which does not extend 
beyond the scope of the Community’s policy on economic 
and social cohesion”. This does not give much guidance on 
the question whether ‘specific actions’ could comprise the 
adoption of (minimum) harmonising legislation.  
However, in principle, it does not seem impossible to defend 
that the introduction of an EU minimum wage is an ‘EU ac-
tion’, as this term could be considered to comprise both legal 
and non-legal measures. There are areas where the EU is 
given the competence to adopt ‘incentive measures’ or 
‘measures to complement actions of the Member States’ but 
which exclude the harmonisation of Member States’ laws, 
notably in the areas of complementary competence such as 
education (Article 165 TFEU), culture (Article 167 TFEU) and 
tourism (Article 195 TFEU). In these cases, the provision itself 
explicitly excludes such harmonisation. Article 175 TFEU, in a 
marked difference, does not feature such a prohibition. Social 
and economic cohesion is, instead, a shared competence, 
where according to Article 2 TFEU the Union may legislate. To 
derive a prohibition of harmonisation, or of substantive legis-
lation, from the word ‘actions’ or ‘specific actions’ would 
seem overly restrictive: it would go against the principle of 
effectiveness and does not seem to be supported by the case 
law of the CJEU. 
 
Similarly, the fact that the provision enshrines the role of co-
ordination and funding in cohesion policy does not neces-
sarily confine all EU actions in this field to measures of coor-
dination or funding. In fact, a step-by-step reading of the Ar-
ticle clearly suggests that different forms of EU action are 
possible for attaining the overall objective in Article 174 
TFEU, which include, but are not necessarily limited to, 
measures of coordination and action through the Structural 
Funds. This is supported by the explicit wording of the provi-
sion where Article 175 TFEU foresees also actions ‘outside the 
Funds’. 
Another ambiguity can be found in Article 175 TFEU where it 
says ‘without prejudice to the measures decided upon within 
the framework of the other Union policies’. Could it be ar-
gued that this lays down a subordination of Article 175 TFEU 
to other provisions in the Treaty, in a way that would hamper 
the adoption of a minimum wage directive on this legal basis? 
There is no ground to interpret this phrase to such a limiting 
extent. First, the wording of the caveat itself is weak. If the 
provision had read ‘to be decided upon’ or ‘other provisions 
of the Treaties’, it might have been different, but even then, 
the Treaty is riddled with such references (see, for example 
Article 18 TFEU on nationality discrimination or Article 22 
TFEU on citizenship) which have not been given a restrictive 
reading. Furthermore, while it may be taken to mean that 
measures adopted under this provision need to respect exist-
ing measures adopted on the basis of other provisions, this 
does not cause any problems: at present there seems to be 
no such measure that would stand in the way of a minimum 
wage directive.  
In similar vein, it may be argued that Article 153 TFEU is the 
more specific provision (lex specialis) for what a minimum 
wage directive would try to achieve, and as such it should be 
used. However, the CJEU’s case law does not seem to prohibit 
the use of a more general and indirect legal basis, provided 
that its conditions are fulfilled, if the more specific legal basis 
excludes the type of action to be taken. Examples are the To-
bacco Advertisement legislation adopted based on Article 
114 TFEU because the legal basis on public health excludes 
harmonisation, or the above-mentioned Gauweiler and 
Weiss cases.  Arguably, it is thus precisely because Article 
153(5) excludes the issue of pay that another legal basis, like 
Article 175 TFEU, can be used. Indeed, the most logical inter-
pretation is that this limitation in paragraph 5 only applies to 
Article 153 TFEU itself and does not prevent the EU legislature 
to use another provision in the Treaties as a legal basis, pro-
vided there is one. This interpretation is supported by a tex-
tual interpretation of Article 153(5) which says that “the pro-
visions of this Article shall not apply to pay” – meaning that 
other provisions potentially can.  
It is true that in relation to this provision, the Court has con-
sistently held that the “establishment of the level of the vari-
ous parts of pay of a worker fall outside the competence of 
the EU legislature and rests with the Member States’”(C-
395/08 - Bruno and Others, EU:C:2010:329, §39; C-268/06 – 
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Impact, EU:C:2008:223, §129). These words could be inter-
preted as a more general statement of the limits of EU pow-
ers. This seems to have been the approach taken by Advo-
cate-General  Jääskinen in Case C-507/13 (United Kingdom v 
Parliament and Council, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2394, §114) where 
he opined (in relation to the CRD IV Directive) that in light of 
this above-mentioned statement by the Court, another legal 
basis (in this case Article 53(1) TFEU) could not be used “in 
order to circumvent the limitation imposed by Article 153(5) 
TFEU”. This Opinion is not binding and does not seem to be in 
keeping with the approach of the Court to legal basis choice 
in general. The CJEU’s stance instead appears to be that as 
long as the conditions for the use of a particular legal basis 
are fulfilled, it is irrelevant whether the matter is explicitly 
prohibited or excluded from another legal basis. Another in-
terpretation could seriously harm the effectiveness of EU law. 
And again, textually, the argument for such a cross-cutting 
prohibition seems to fall flat in the face of the explicit phras-
ing that “the provisions of this Article shall not apply to pay”.  
Alternative legal bases 
Beyond the realm of social and cohesion policy, there are a 
number of other options worth contemplating. 
The flexibility clause 
For attaining one of the objectives set in the Treaties where 
these do not provide the necessary powers, on the basis of 
Article 352 TFEU, the Council, acting unanimously on a pro-
posal from the Commission and after obtaining the consent 
of the Parliament, may adopt the appropriate measures. Fol-
lowing Article 3 TEU, a highly competitive social market econ-
omy aims at full employment and social protection and shall 
combat social exclusion and discrimination. Arguably, the so-
called ‘flexibility clause’ could serve to implement such objec-
tives through EU minimum wages. 
Nevertheless, a proposal for a directive on minimum wages 
based on Article 352 TFEU would come up against a number 
of drawbacks. First, besides the obstacle of unanimity and the 
special legislative procedure that downgrades the role of the 
Parliament, national procedures might block the use of this 
provision. This is the case of Germany, for example, that re-
quires a law for any measure that is adopted under this pro-
vision to be passed with a two-third majority both in the Bun-
destag and the Bundesrat. Second, an arguably even bigger 
obstacle relates to the explicit limitation to use this provision 
to adopt laws or regulations where the Treaties exclude such 
harmonisation. It is unclear whether the exclusion of ‘pay’ un-
der Article 153(5) TFEU constitutes such a ‘prohibition of har-
monisation’ in the sense of Article 352 TFEU. The European 
Commission previously did not think so, as it proposed the 
Monti II Regulation, an initiative on collective action which is 
another field excluded under Article 153(5) TFEU, on the basis 
of Article 352 TFEU. Then again, this proposal became the 
first victim of the ‘yellow card’ procedure, as national parlia-
ments considered this an illegitimate way of circumventing 
Article 153(5) TFEU. 
Approximation of laws 
Could a directive on minimum wages be based on the general 
harmonisation of the internal market enshrined in Article 115 
TFEU, which applies explicitly to fields excluded from its ‘twin’ 
Article 114 TFEU such as ‘measures that affect the right and 
interests of employed persons’? First, it is not immediately 
clear that wage differences between the Member States di-
rectly affect the functioning of the internal market in more 
than a number of specific sectors. Moreover, the adoption of 
measures under Article 115 TFEU requires unanimity. Most 
importantly, the adoption of an instrument on the basis of 
the internal market is likely to backlash when the interests of 
the internal market conflict with the social objective. This was 
at the centre of the discussion in Viking and Laval (C-438/05 - 
The International Transport Workers' Federation and The 
Finnish Seamen's Union, EU:C:2007:772 and C-341/05 – Laval 
un Partneri, EU:C:2007:809). In these cases, the fact that the 
Posting of Workers Directive was adopted on the services 
provisions in the Treaties pushed the CJEU to interpret the 
directive in light of its main objective and see the instrument 
as a maximum harmonisation of labour standards rather than 
a social minimum directive. This subordinated workers’ fun-
damental social rights to the economic interests of the inter-
nal market. 
If the objective of adopting a minimum wage directive is to 
fight in-work poverty and guarantee fair wages for workers in 
order to enhance social progress in Europe to further its more 
harmonious development, a directive on minimum wages 
should have a social focus. If follows, that the usage of Article 
115 TFEU for the adoption of a directive on minimum wages 
should be avoided.  
The free movement of workers 
A final approach to consider would be to adopt a directive on 
minimum wages under Article 46 TFEU according to which 
‘the European Parliament and the Council shall, acting in ac-
cordance with the ordinary legislative procedure … issue di-
rectives or regulations setting out measures required to bring 
about freedom of workers’. Using free movement of workers 
as the legal basis for the adoption of a directive on minimum 
wages would entail QMV. However, it seems quite an over-
stretch to argue that a directive on minimum wages at the EU 
level has in fact the objective of enhancing the free move-
ment of workers. It may, in contrast, be argued that it may 
have the opposite effect, as such a directive would, to some 
extent, eliminate the wage-incentive that induces many 
workers to move. 
Conclusion 
Given the content and the objective of a directive on mini-
mum wages that guarantees fair wages for workers as to ef-
fectively tackle in-work poverty, this instrument should have 
a strong social focus so that in the case that conflict arises 
between social and other interests, the former always pre-
vail. Moreover, because of the high sensitivity in the area of 
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wages, with some Member States arguing a possible down-
ward pressure and others fearing that they will lose their 
competitive advantage in the internal market, a legal basis 
that allows for QMV would be necessary to avoid vetoes.  Not 
subordinating the role of the Parliament to consultation, 
moreover, would increase the democratic value of a directive 
in minimum wages. 
In light of these considerations, the most desirable and real-
istic options for the Commission can be narrowed down to 
two. Keeping on the beaten track of the social policy title, the 
Commission could try to propose an instrument on minimum 
wages under Article 153 TFEU that in no direct way interferes 
with fixing the level of minimum wages. Or it would take a 
road much less travelled, and propose a fully-fledged mini-
mum wage directive based on Article 175 TFEU.  
Because a directive on the basis of social policy would be sub-
stantially limited to regulating methods and rules of alloca-
tion of pay, therefore having minimal impact on the adequacy 
of wages, it is highly unlikely that such a directive would have 
the necessary drive to boost upward convergence on mini-
mum wages and effectively tackle the issue of in-work pov-
erty. Hence, any such measure that would manage to avoid 
being struck down by the exception of Article 153(5) TFEU 
would necessarily lack the very substance and thus legal and 
political punch that the promised initiative should carry to 
avoid disappointment and backlash. 
The more innovative approach under the cohesion policy, by 
contrast, could indeed contain provisions on adequacy, in-
cluding methodologies to establish adequate incomes so as 
to fight income poverty. The use of this legal basis, while 
somewhat creative, would thus allow for a directive on mini-
mum wages that is rich in content, can be adopted through 
the ordinary legislative procedure and by QMV and has at its 
centre the social objective of diminishing economic and social 
disparities between Member States. It is uncharted territory 
and, as such, not an entirely risk-free approach (either), but if 
the Commission is serious about delivering legally on the po-
litical promises made, then this seems the most viable way. 
Ultimately, the challenges that plague the successful adop-
tion of legislation in matters of social policy, that translates 
clear objectives of the Union and basic fundamental social 
rights enshrined in primary law, seriously beg the question of 
whether the limitation on social policy competence should be 
revisited. This could be done either by amending the social 
policy title or by starting a discussion about a future Treaty 
revision that gives sufficient social competences to the EU so 
as to finally become a true social market economy.  
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